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iAbstract
Eﬃciency Study of Sybil Attack on P2P Botnets
Yuhang Luo
The main objective of this thesis is to modeling and analysis of Kademlia based Bot-
nets in order to study the eﬃciency of Sybil attack on such botnets.
We start by researching the structure of Kademlia and specially its look-up procedure,
i.e. the process how a node ﬁnd a desired target node in the Botnet. For the simplicity
of analysis, two assumptions are made: a) node ID space is full ﬁlled; b) a Sybil node
replies a fake triple when it is queried.With these assumptions, the probability jumping
functions and jumping matrices are derived. By adding the distribution of Sybil nodes,
we obtain the probability that target nodes are found successfully(Psuccess).
We then show numerical results of the distribution of Psuccess with diﬀerent system pa-
rameters. From the results, we can obtain some insight on how the parameters aﬀect
the eﬃciency of Sybil attack. Among all these parameters, we ﬁnd that α, which is
known as the number of nodes the initial node requries, is the key parameter of Kadem-
lia based botnet. We also discuss how the triples a node keeps for every distance (k)
and the total number of nodes in botnet (n) will aﬀect Psuccess.
Based on our model and numerical results, we will draw some conclusions on how to
make P2P botnet more robust or more vulnerable in facing Sybil attacking.
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In this information era, Internet usage has been growing signiﬁcantly in the past twenty
years [1, 2]. With the rapid growth of the Internet, malwares have also been developed
during the past decades. Among the many malwares, Botnet has been considered to be
the most serious threat, because botnet makes it possible for one botmaster to control
a network constituted by huge number of compromised systems [3]. The situation gets
worse when botnet is combined with Peer-to-Peer(P2P)[4, 5] networks.
1.1.1 Client-Server model and Peer-to-Peer model
Peer-to-Peer(P2P) network is originally designed for sharing computer resources, such
as storage, video stream and CPU cycles[6]. Recently, more and more applications
use P2P as their communication model. Figure1.1a shows a schematic diagram of
Client-server model. Every client connects to server directly, whereas Figure1.1b is the
1.1. Overview 2
P2P model that all nodes connect to each other without a central server. There are
strengths and weaknesses for both models.
The Client-Server model is widely used from the beginning of Internet. Several well
known Internet protocol, such as SMTP, HTTP and FTP, are based on Client-Server
model [7]. Also, Internet Relay Chat(IRC) is built on Client-Server model. This model
performs well in terms of server maintenance, service assurance in dedicated servers
and security. Highly relying on server is the main disadvantage of Client-Server model.
More clients lead to high data loading which slows down the connecting speed. And



















(b) Peer to Peer model
Figure 1.1: Two types of communication model
P2P model partially solved the drawback of Client-Server model because of its
structure. In P2P model, every peer acts as both client and server, so more peers
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lead to high loading and more bandwidths. distributing the information(ﬁle, video,
etc) in the whole P2P network makes it work as usual even when some peers leave the
network. Detailed advantages are listed as following:
Robustness: As a distributed network, P2P model is hard to be attacked. It’s pos-
sible to shut down one or several peers, but which won’t have big inﬂuence on
P2P network, because it’s normal to have peers join or leave dynamically. The
distributed Denial-of-Service(DDoS) attack, which is a nightmare for most web
sites [8], can not attack P2P network.
Anonymity: Once a P2P network has been built up, all peers are acting similarly to
each other. So it is hard to know who controls the network.
Scalability: More peers bring both data loading and bandwidth at the same time.
Meanwhile, more peers store more copies of information, which strengthens the
network.
Storage: Every peer is a storage device in P2P model, so the storage space is extremely
large.
Due to those advantages of P2P model, more and more applications use P2P model
as communication module. However, the key problem in P2P model is how to search
desired information, that is why the distributed hash table(DHT) is introduced.
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1.1.2 Distributed hash table
The earlier P2P systems are not fully decentralized. Since the information is distributed
among the whole network, an index web site is needed for searching. Napster[9] is one
of those networks. Later, edonkey [10] uses a server to list the ed2k link. Even the
edonkey network is decentralized, it somehow relies on the server.
To make a P2P network fully decentralized, distributed hash table has drawn at-
tention of research community. Several research has been done in the ﬁeld.
Pastry[11] was developed by Antony Rowstron and Peter Druschel. It uses an 128
bit ID space. Each Pastry node is randomly issued an uniform node ID. On top of
the DHT, a routing overlay network is designed for measuring the scalability and fault
tolerance to reduce the routing cost. Routing overlay network collects information to
build several lists, such as leaf nodes list, routing table and a neighbor list. In leaf nodes
list, closest nodes are stored together in terms of node ID and direction of the circle.
At least two applications are based on Pastry, which are PAST and SCRIBE[12, 13].
Chord was proposed in 2001 by Ion Stoica and his team in 2001 ??. Structured like
Pastry, Chord organizes the ID-key pair on a circle by hashing IP address and keyword
of divided information separately. The key is stored in the closest next existed node to
avoid issuing key to non-existent nodes. Then method of dichotomic classiﬁcation was
used in routing. Comparing to Pastry, Chord is a less complicated DHT solution.
Content addressable network(CAN)[14] is another well known DHT. “A virtual
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multi-dimensional Cartesian coordinate space” is the core of design. The virtual multi-
dimensional coordinate space can be deemed as virtual address in network layer, inde-
pendently from all under layers. The routing table consists of IP address and virtual
zone pairs. One characteristic of CAN is that the maintaining of state is independent
with the network size.
Kademlia[15] was designed in 2002. Kademlia deﬁnes distance as the bitwise ex-
clusive of their node IDs. A lot of applications are built on Kademlia, such as KAD,
Overnet, BitTorrent[16], Osiris sps, etc. In this thesis, I will mainly focus on Kademlia
based P2P botnets. More details about Kademlia will be discussed in Chapter 2.
DHT is a method to map values to nodes in a distributed system. It’s widely used
in most of the P2P networks today.
1.1.3 Sybil attack
Though there are a lot of advantages for P2P model, it also has some weaknesses.
One is that nodes join the network freely and every node stores partial routing table,
so nodes leaving has inﬂuence on the P2P network. Though every decentralized P2P
protocol tries to optimize nodes joining and leaving, multiple leaving is still a potential
threat to P2P network. Then, if someone creates large quantities of nodes and has those
nodes join P2P network, he may gain a unbalanced high inﬂuence, which is known as
Sybil attack.
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In 2002, John R. Douceur indicated decentralized network is susceptible in facing
Sybil attack[17]. It is proved that any decentralized network which remote entities are
not speciﬁed is vulnerable to Sybil attacks. Then this method is used to against P2P
network which people share music or other copyrighted documents and it is proved to
be useful to some extend.
1.2 Botnet
A bot, or known as zombie computer, is a personal computer or any online device which
is infected unnoticed and controlled by hackers. Botnet is such a network which consists
of bots. From its emergence in 1993, botnet has been developed a lot in the past three
decades and it became a big threat to the Internet community. Its attacks include(not
limited to) DDoS, adware, spyware, spamdexing, click fraud and even stealing conﬁden-
tial information such as driver’s license and credit card number[18]. Generally, botnet
is categorized into two main classes, centralized botnet and decentralized botnet.
1.2.1 Centralized botnet
The ﬁrst generation of botnet are Internet Relay Chat(IRC) based network, which
is a centralized botnet. The botmaster, as the operator of botnet, sets up an IRC
channel to publish command. This IRC server is called command and control(C&C)
server. Botmaster uses the botnet to do DDoS attacks, sending spam emails, etc. Some
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examples are listed below:
EggDrop: [19] is believed to be the ﬁrst botnet ever, and EggDrop is also a non-
malicious botnet. It was designed for managing and protecting an IRC channel.
Agobot: Cooke05thezombie also known as Gaobot, was developed mainly with C++.
Agobot is an user friendly software, which means using Agobot requires little
or no programming background. It applies features such as harvesting email
addresses, spam, DDoS attacks and Click Fraud, etc.
Akbot: is an botnet consisted of over 1 million computers. It is used for gathering
data, performing DDoS attacks. The owner of Akbot was caught but released
without conviction.
Zeus: uses a Trojan horse as its infection method. Zeus is believed divided into small
botnets and sold to individuals. It has been reported of stealing personal data,
spam email and stealing credit card information from banks.
Besides IRC based botnet, another centralized botnet is called social network based
botnet, that is, their Command and Control process is done through social networks,
such as fackook, twitter and some other familiar websites[20].
Asprox botnet[21] was reported in 2008, which is a botnet using its own server and
advanced fast-ﬂux network as C&C procedure. It shares the most of important design
features as other centralized botnets.
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There is a common weakness for all centralized botnets, which is once the channel
has been shut, the whole botnet is dead, though the virus is still on victims’ computers.
Then, those hackers turn to ﬁnd a more robust communication module for their botnet.
Then P2P based botnet comes out.
1.2.2 Decentralized botnet
Hackers are searching for a robust, anonymous and scalable network protocol for their
botnet. P2P model seems to meet all the demands. As a result, not only new de-
veloped botnets but also traditional botnets tend to use P2P model as its whole or
partial communication module. The function of centralized and decentralized botnet
are almost the same. Table 1.1 is a time table of P2P model and botnets.
The P2P based botnet is more cryptical and resilient, which makes it harder to be
detected or measured. Following are some detected examples of decentralized (P2P
based) botnets:
TDL-4: [22] which was ﬁnd by Kaspersky Lab in 2008. TDL-4 uses a identiﬁer called
“bsh parameter” that plays an important rule in its connecting procedure. More-
over, the TDL-4 botnet also uses KAD network to publish commands.
Zeus: [23, 24] Zeus botnet starts as a centralized botnet and recruits mainly by phish-
ing and drive-by downloads. Zeus was used to attack or steal from a lot of famous
companies, organizations and even government departments, including Bank of
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Date Name type Description
05/1999 Napster P2P P2P protocol was used for the ﬁrst time
11/1999 Direct Connect P2P developed Napster model
03/2000 Gnutella P2P fully decentralized P2P model
09/2000 eDonkey P2P used Multisource File Transfer Protocol
03/2001 Fast Track P2P supernodes are used within P2P protocol
07/2001 BitTorrent P2P supernodes are used within P2P protocol
09/2003 Sinit Botnet random scanning look-up
11/2003 Kademlia P2P XOR matrix based P2P protocol
03/2004 Phatbot Botnet WASTE based botnet
03/2006 SpamThru Botnet a custom backup protocol used
01/2007 Peacomm Botnet based on Kademlia
Table 1.1: Time table of P2P networks and botnets
America, ABC, Cisco, Amazon, NASA and even United States Department of
Transportation. In October 2011, it is reported by abuse.ch that the new vision
of Zeus is to take a Kademlia-like strategy in its communication module [24].
Waledac: [25] Waledac is a typical e-mail spam botnet, and was taken down by Mi-
crosoft in March 2010. Microsoft won a court that taking the ownership of 276
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domains which are believed using by Waledac as server [26]. However, Waledac
also uses an unknown P2P protocol as backup, so the botmaster might not lose
the control to Waledac.
Storm: [27] Storm attracted public attention in earlier 2007, when 8% of all malware
which is on Windows computers are occupied by Storm. Later, Microsoft claims
that the Malicious software Removal Tool(MSRT) has removed storm from more
than 526, 000 personal computers [28, 29]. However, some research do not agree
with that result. They believe that it is a botmaster’s choice to have a smaller
storm botnet [30]. In a word, Storm botnet is a good example of P2P botnet,
which attracts a lot of researchers.
Several case studies have been done in the ﬁeld[19, 31, 32]. Generally, it takes two
steps to recruit new bots, a) use Trojan horse to infect initial binary. After this binary
is installed, the injected bot has the basic functions, such as maintain persistence
and join the P2P botnet. b) Once it joined P2P botnet, secondary injections will be
downloaded to make the bot fully functional. Step a) is done by Trojan email as well
as pornography website. The Trojan horse appearances as a video ﬁle but in fact it is
an executable ﬁle. Even more, some Trojan horse disables windows ﬁrewall in order to
make step b) execute without any warning.
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1.3 Related work
Research on botnet are mainly in three categories, which are a) Botnet detection;
b) reverse engineering on speciﬁed botnet; c) modeling and analysis of botnet.
There are several detection techniques[33, 34, 35]. In [36], Feily categories those
techniques as signature-based, anomaly-based, DNS-based, and mining-based. Another
research uses method to classify as honeynets based detection and Intrusion Detection
System (IDS) based detection[37]. Khan uses data mining technique to detect the
traﬃc of botnet [38]. An ensemble classiﬁcation approach was proposed to deal with
concept-drift and using all historical data. Ping and her team shows that present
honeypot technique may be detected by botmaster by checking if bot can send out
malicious traﬃc successfully [39].
Reverse engineering provides details of a single bot. Through which, it helps in
understanding the behavior of botnet. Julian analyzed Trojan.Peacomm with PerilEyez
malware tool and honeypot[19]. During the two weeks experiment, she researched the
two steps of infection and the communication protocol. The Overnet protocol was
detected in her case study. Thorsten Holz tracked Storm Worm and gave several
measurement results [31]. During over four months detection, the result shows Storm
infected machines in Overnet lays lower bound being around 5, 000 − 6, 000 bots and
around 45, 000−80, 000 bots for upper bound. In treating Storm as a black box system,
Holz indicates it is vulnerable to Sybil attack. The diﬀerence from our research is that
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we analyze the structure of kademlia(which Storm is based on) instead of treating it
as black box.
Brett Stone-Gross and his team analyzed botnet takeover. In their research [40],
a botnet called Torpig has been taken for ten days. Within those ten days, more
than 180, 000 infections were observed. It gives detailed information about how botnet
operates. Moreover, the analysis of the decrypted data, it shows that Torpig has a
wide targeted list, which includes PayPal, Poste Italiane, E-Trade, Capital One and
Chase, as well as several popular credit card companies.
Carlton R. Davis models Sybil attack on Storm using graph theory and birth and
death process [41]. He also gives a simulation result shown the relationship between
botnet growth rate and Sybil birth rate. Like Holz’s work, Carlton also treats Storm
as a blackbox. Ping Wang did a systematic study on P2P botnet[42]. Her systematic
study fully describes all important characteristic of Storm. In her research, she does
not analyze structure neither but she uses some results of [43]. In [43], the hop cost
of Kademlia is discussed. The author focuses on k-bucket and results in average bits
closer to target node. The diﬀerence between our research and theirs is that we give
more details about Kademlia structure by using steps distribution.
1.4 Organization of the thesis
The rest of the thesis is organized as following:
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• Chapter 2 presents mathematic analysis about structure of kademlia. Firstly,
more details about kademlia algorithm and Storm is given. Secondly, the system
is analyzed with diﬀerent parameter α one by one.
• Chapter 3 gives numerical results of possible Sybil attacks. With diﬀerent pa-
rameters, the results show how the eﬃciency of Sybil attack varies. The results
are also compared with the results in [42].
• In chapter 4, we will conclude our work and discuss some possible future work.
Chapter 2
Eﬃciency Analysis of Sybil attack on
P2P Botnets
2.1 Introduction of Kademlia
Kademlia algorithm is used by several P2P network, such as Overnet, KAD network
and BitTorrent.
In Kademlia, every node stores a <key, value> pair and a triple list of <IP address,
UDP port, Node ID>. The value in the <key, value> pair is a piece of divided
information saved in the network, whereas key is an identiﬁer of where that piece of
information is stored. In which, key is 160 bit opaque, hashed or partially hashed
from value. A <key, value> is stored in the node where ID is closest to the key.
The <IP address, UDP port, Node ID> triple list contains some contact information.
Detailed information pertaining to triple listing will be presented later in the thesis.
Each Kademlia node has a unique node ID and it is randomly chosen from ID space.
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The ID space is a binary tree and the quantity of IDs varies from network to network,
160 bits in [15] and 128 bits in [44], etc. For any given node, the ID space has been
divided into subtrees. Half of binary tree exclusive of the node itself, constitutes the
highest subtree. Half of the rest tree, exclusdes the node itself, constitutes the second
highest subtree, et cetera. Kedamlia protocol ensures that each node at least knows
one node from each of its subtrees. Figure2.1 shows an example of node ID space and
subtrees. Taking node 011 for instance, there are three subtrees for node 011 and it
knows at least one node in each of its subtrees.
000 001 010 011 100 101 110 111
subtree1subtree2 subtree3
Figure 2.1: An example of nodes ID space and subtrees
In Kademlia, the distance between two nodes, node a and node b, is deﬁned as the
bitwise exclusive (XOR) of their nodes IDs, that is, d(a, b) = a ⊕ b. For example, the
distance of node 110 and node 011 is d(110, 011) = 110⊕ 011 = 101. To contact with
other nodes, each node holds N lists of <IP address, UDP port, Node ID> triplets.
For 0 ≤ g < N , a node keeps maximum k triples of other nodes whose distances to
itself are from 2g to 2g+1. These lists are called k-buckets, where k is a system-wide
conﬁgurable parameter, and generally k = 20[15]. If there are less than k nodes in a
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distance range [2g, 2g+1), all triples of nodes in that distance range are kept in the list;
If there are more than k nodes in the distance range, only k triples are kept. Each
k-bucket is recorded by the order of time last seen, most recently seen at the tail and
the least recently seen at the head. When node (receiver) receives message from any
other nodes (transmitter), the k-bucket is updated following some special rules. If
transmitter’s triple exists in receiver’s k-bucket, the triple gets moved to the tail of
the list. If the transmitter’s triple does not exists in the related k-bucket, and that
k-bucket is not full, the receiver adds transmitter’s triple to the tail of the k-bucket. If
the related k-bucket is fully ﬁlled, the receiver pings the node at the head of k-bucket
for more decision parameters. If the node at the head of k-bucket responds, this node
gets to move to the tail and the discards the transmitter’s triple. Otherwise, the node
at head of the k-bucket is deleted from the list, and the transmitter’s triple is added
to the tail of k-bucket. This procedure ensures the most active nodes’ triples are kept.
The ﬂowchart of the progress is shown in ﬁgure2.2.
There are four remote procedure calls (RPCs) in Kademlia protocol as following:
PING: to determine if a node is online;
STORE: to require a node to store a <key, value> pair;
FIND_NODE: to ﬁnd a speciﬁed node. If the receiver is not the target node, it
returns k triples of closest-to-target nodes it knows;
























Figure 2.2: The criteria progress of updating k-bucket
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FIND_VALUE: to ﬁnd a value stored in some speciﬁed nodes. If a node who does
not have that value receives this RPC, it returns k triplets of nodes which most
likely has that value. If a node who has that value received this RPC, it returns
the value.
Lookup is the most important procedure in Kademlia protocol. Lookup procedure
is the way a node (initiator) locating k closest nodes to a target node ID. It starts with
querying α nodes from the k-bucket list which are closest to target node. Each node
of those α nodes returns k closest nodes to the target node in it’s k-buckets. Then the
initiator chooses and queries new α closest nodes which it has never queried before in
the returning list. By repeating described steps, initiator will collect k closest nodes
to the target. As k, α is a system-wide parameter.
2.2 Analysis of Sybil attack on botnet
As shown in Holz’s research [31], it is possible to catch the encrypt keys, which bring
Sybil attack on botnet into reality. However, more detail should be discussed on net-
work level behaviors. Thus our research focus on network module of the botnet. By
analysis of the Kademlia strategy, we want to ﬁnd out how eﬃcient Sybil attack is.
To build a model, several terms are deﬁned as:
• Node I is the initiator node who plans to do lookup. I is its node ID.
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• Node T is the target node I is looking for. T is its node ID.
• Deﬁne the node space size as 2i+1.
• d is the distance of two nodes and dIT = I ⊕ T .
• Deﬁne tree level distance(TLD) as DIT = g + 1 when dIT ∈ [2g, 2g+1).
• k as in k-bucket, is set to 20.
• Pr{x} is the probability that event x occurs.
Besides distance deﬁned by Petar in [15], tree level distance(TLD) is deﬁned in this
research. That is because the nodes are deemed equally in a speciﬁed subtree, and in
which subtree the target node lays, is more important in this research. Then, several
assumptions have been made for our model as following:
1. The node ID space is full, thus, all node IDs have been taken.
2. We analyzes two types of sybil attacks.
• In random sybil attack, when receives find_node or find_value, sybil
nodes reply with a random fake triples of nodes.
• In fake target attack, when receives find_node or find_value, sybil
nodes reply with a fake triple of target node.
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3. Initial node (node I) ID starts with 0 and target node (node T ) ID starts with
1. Which means, node I and node T are in diﬀerent halves of binary tree.
When node I starts to locate node T , it ﬁrst checks the XOR result of their IDs.
From our assumption 3, the preﬁx of I is 0, and the preﬁx of T is 1, so the preﬁx of
XOR is 1, then I knows T is in the other half of the binary tree, [2i, 2i+1). In that
subtree, within those 2i nodes, node I knows 20 nodes from its k-bucket(as k has been
set to 20), which are B1, B2 . . . Bj . . . B20.






if i ≥ 5,
1 if i < 5.
(2.1)
If i = 4 or less, there is only 16 or less nodes in that k-bucket, so node I knows all
nodes in that k-bucket, thus the target node must be in the related bucket. So Pk is 1
when i is 4 or less.
With probability 1 − Pk, node I queries α closest nodes to node T . The α as
introduced before, is a system-wide parameter. Three cases, α = 1, α = 2 and α = 3
will be discussed separately.
2.2.1 When α = 1
To ﬁnd node T , node I sends find_node to 1 closest node in Bi. Before this action,
the tree level distance between node T and node I is i. Let Bc to be the closest node
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Figure 2.3: Distances form the view of node 0011
in I’s k-bucket, and Bc ∈ {Bj}. In order to ﬁnd the probability distribution of the
distance between node Bc and node T , we let m be a positive integer in the range of
0 ≤ m ≤ i. The probability of that distance being lager than m is calculated ﬁrst:
Pr{DBcT ≥ m} = Pr{DB1T ≥ m,DB2T ≥ m. . .DB20T ≥ m}
= Pr{all DBjT ≥ m} j = 1, 2 . . . 20.
(2.2)
Because DBcT is a distance, it must be a nonnegative integer:
Pr{DBcT ≥ 0} = 1
The distance of two nods is the XOR of their node IDs, so the distance a node to
itself is 0, and the tree level distance(TLD) is 0 too. Thus means, DBcT = 0 indicates
that Bc is T . Figure 2.3 is a illustration of a subtree with 16 nodes in it. Here we take
node 0011 for instance, the TLD has been marked in the ﬁgure. Because the distance
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from node 0000 and node 0001 to 0011 is given by 0000 ⊕ 0011 = 0011 = 3 and
0001⊕ 0011 = 0010 = 2, then from our deﬁnition of TLD, both TLD are 2. Thinking
a subtree with 2i nodes in it, DBcT is larger than 1 means that node Bc can be any
nodes besides the target nodes, so it is:




























Using mathematical induction we have:








) m = 1, 2 . . . i− 1. (2.3)
So probability mass function(pmf) can be given as:











) m = 1, 2 . . . i− 1.
(2.4)
When node I queries node Bc, node Bc returns k = 20 closest nodes B′1, B′2, . . . B′20.
Among those 20 nodes, let B′c to be the closet node to T . Following the same process,
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the probability of the new closest distance m′ can be given as:








) m′ = 1, 2 . . .m− 1. (2.5)











) m′ = 1, 2 . . .m− 1
(2.6)
Every time node I queries and checks the closest node, it gets closer to node T .
Equation (2.6) gives the probability of closest distance jumping from m to m′ when
node I queries and checks once. Let A(j, k) to be the distance jumping probability of
one query and check, where j is the TLD before jumping and k is after jumping. So




A(1, 1) 0 · · · 0 0
A(2, 1) 0 · · · 0 0
...
... . . .
...
...




In matrix A˜, TLD gets closer in every query and check, thus a jumping that
results in a same or greater TLD is impossible, so only the those ones under the
diagonal are non-zero elements. Besides , there are some special cases. Element
A(2, 1), A(3, 1), A(3, 2), A(4, 1), A(4, 2), A(4, 3) are all zero, that is because when dis-
tance is less than or equal to 4, the queried node returns all 16 nodes it knows to node
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I, and the target node must be in that 16 nodes. Thus means, the distance jumps to 0
directly. The other special case is element A(5, 4). For only 16 nodes within the TLD
4 and k is set to 20, it makes A(5, 4) an impossible jump.
Also, from equation 2.1 the probability that B′c is T is given as:





if m ≥ 5,
1 if m < 5.
(2.8)
So equation (2.8) gives the jumping function of any TLD to 0. Let j to be the TLD
before jumping and B(j, 0) to be the probability of jumping from j to 0 after one query












By now, matrix A˜ and B˜ give all the possibility of jumping with one query and
check. To ﬁnd the distribution of the number of steps needed to reach target node
from initial node, matrix C˜ is introduced. Let C(j, l) be the probability that when tree
level distance is j, it needs l steps to reach T . Matrix C˜ can be calculated from these
two following equations:
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A(j, x)× C(x, l − 1) l = 1, 2 . . . j − 1; j = 1, 2 . . . i (2.11)




C(1, 1) 0 · · · 0 0
C(2, 1) 0 · · · 0 0
...
... . . .
...
...




The last row of C˜ gives the probability distribution of the number of steps node I
will be taking to reach node T . Assume Psybil is the percentage of sybil nodes within




C(i, x)× (1− Psybil)x (2.13)
The equation (2.13) is suitable for both attack model. Because of querying only
one node in every step, even one sybil node during the querying results in lookup
fail. With equation 2.13, it is possible to get a numerical result. In ﬁgure2.4, X axis
is the percentage of Sybil nodes, and Y axis is the probability of target node found
successfully. The total number of nodes is set to 2128. The network shows vulnerability
2.2. Analysis of Sybil attack on botnet 26
in facing Sybil attack. With 1% of Sybil nodes, Psuccess drops to around 80%, And















































Figure 2.4: The distribution of Psuccess when α = 1
2.2.2 When α = 2
When α = 2, the querying and checking progress is similar to α = 1. The only
diﬀerence is that node I queries 2 nodes every time instead of 1. Let assume Bs is the
second closest node in I’s k-bucket, so Bs ∈ {Bj}. Let positive integer ms be in the
range of 0 ≤ ms ≤ m ≤ i. Similar to the case of α = 1, to ﬁnd Pr{DBsT} = ms,
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Pr{DBsT} ≥ ms is calculated ﬁrst. Because the closest node Bc has been taken, that
TLD between the second closest node Bs and target node is equal to or greater than
ms means the TLD between all other 19 nodes and the target node are equal to or
greater than ms, which is:
Pr{DBsT ≥ ms | DBcT = m}
= Pr{all DBjT ≥ ms | DBcT = m} j = 1, 2 . . . 20 Bj = Bc.
(2.14)
Also, TLD is a nonnegative integer, so we have:
Pr{DBsT ≥ 0} = 1
Recalling the binary tree and ﬁgure 2.3, sample space is the total number of nodes
i with the closest node Bc taken out. Because the probability distribution of the
second closest node depends on the distribution of the closest node, diﬀerent cases are
discussed separately as follows. Firstly, when DBcT = 0, which means node Bc is the
target node, the TLD of node Bs and T must be equal to or lager than 1, because the
tree level distance of node Bc and T is 0. DBsT ≥ 2 happens when all other 19 nodes
(including Bs) are placed at where the TLD is larger than or equal to 2, this means,
those 19 nodes can be chosen from all the places except 2 nodes, one is node T and
the other is its closest neighbor. DBsT ≥ 3 means those 19 nodes can be chosen from
all nodes except 4 nodes, node T and other three nodes in the same smallest subtree
2.2. Analysis of Sybil attack on botnet 28
with T , etc. Then we have:




























From the above equations, it is concluded as:








) ms = 1, 2 . . . i (2.15)
Secondly, when DBcT = 1, node Bc is not node T but its closest neighbor, so the
sample space for choosing node Bs is 2i−2. TLD of node Bs and node T must be equal
to or greater than 2. Similar to the case of DBcT = 0, DBsT ≥ 3 occurs when those 19
nodes are chosen besides 4 nodes, target node, node Bc and two closest neighbors, etc.
It gives:
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Pr{DBsT ≥ 0 | DBcT = 1} =1
Pr{DBsT ≥ 1 | DBcT = 1} =1



















And then we have:








) ms = 2, 3 . . . i (2.16)
From equation (2.15) and (2.16), a more general equation can be written as:











) ms ∈ (m, i], m = 0, 1
1 ms ∈ [0,m], m = 0, 1
(2.17)
Thirdly, when DBcT = 2, Bs can be placed at everywhere besides 3 places, the
target node, the closest node to target node and node Bc. Then the sample space is
2i − 3. Taking the same method, it gives:
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Pr{DBsT ≥ 2 | DBcT = 2} =1




























Then it is summed as:








) ms = 3, 4 . . . i (2.18)
Fourthly, when DBcT = 3, the sample space is 2i − 2(3−1) − 1. It is because Bs
can not be placed where the distance is less than 3 and Bc has taken one place at the
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subtree of distance 3. So we have:
Pr{DBsT ≥ 3 | DBcT = 3} =1




























To sum up the above equations, we have:








) ms = 3, 4 . . . i (2.19)
Cases when m = 4, 5, 6 · · · are similar to m = 2 and m = 3, that means node Bc
always occupies one place in subtree of TLD m. Then from equation 2.18 and 2.19, we
have:











) ms ∈ (m, i], m = 2, 3, 4 · · · i
1 ms ∈ [0,m], m = 2, 3, 4 · · · i
(2.20)
From equation (2.17) and (2.20), it is possible to calculate the probability of
Pr{DBsT = ms | DBcT = m}, simply minus Pr{DBsT ≥ ms | DBcT = m} by
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Pr{DBsT ≥ ms + 1 | DBcT = m}. However, this method is only suitable for ms ∈
(m, i − 1] and there are some exceptions. a) when ms = i and ms > m, node T is in












when m = 2, 3, 4 · · · i − 1. b) when ms = m and
ms ∈ [2, i− 1], Pr{DBsT = ms | DBcT = m} equals to 1− Pr{DBsT ≥ m+ 1 | DBcT =
m}. c) that two nodes are both 0 or 1 away from node T is impossible. d) when m = i
occurs, ms must be equal to m. e) due to our assumption, ms < m is impossible.After
all the conditions are discussed, Pr{DBsT = ms | DBcT = m} is given by:
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) ms = i and ms = m, m = 2, 3, 4 · · · i− 1
0 ms = m and m ∈ [0, 1]
1 ms = m = i
0 ms < m
(2.21)
Equation (2.21) follows all the steps introduced in Kademlia protocol, so it gives
the most accurate result. However, it is too complicate to do further derivation with
Equation (2.21), so the model is simpliﬁed in this research. In the original Kademlia
protocol, each node of those α queried nodes returns k closest nodes triples in its
respective bucket. Then, node I send find_node to new closest α nodes among
those nodes it received. In this research, after node I receives new information from
α nodes, it ﬁnd out the most closest one node (TLD = m) and we assume the second
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closest node is uniformly distributed in [m, i−1). This simpliﬁcation makes very small
inﬂuence on ﬁnal result, since the most important characteristic - query and check two
node at one time - has been kept. To ﬁnd the closest node in the returning information,
the triplets returned form those nodes need to be compared. Let node B′c and node
B′s to be the closest node in the related bucket of node Bc and node Bs respectively.
Let m′ to be the closest TLD returning from B′c, whereas m′s to be the closest TLD
returning from B′s. Then m′ and node m′s are given by equation (2.5). Let Bo to be
the new closest node and mo to be the new closest TLD after one query. Because each
of node B′c and node B′s returns the triples independently, probability Pr{DBoT ≥ mo}
can be ﬁnd:
Pr{DBoT ≥ mo | DBcT = m,DBsT = ms}


















mo ∈ [1,m− 1]
(2.22)
Following the same steps as when α = 1, we have:
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Pr{DBoT = mo | DBcT = m,DBsT = ms}
= Pr{DBoT ≥ mo | DBcT = m,DBsT = ms}





















mo ∈ [1,m− 1]
(2.23)
So equation (2.23) is the jumping function for α = 2. Diﬀerent from when α = 2,
2.23 gives the jumping form two closest nodes to the newer closest one node. Now
thinking about a TLD pair (j, k), in which j is the closest TLD and k is the second
closest TLD, after one query the newer closest TLD is o. Then letA2(j, k, o) to be the
probability that after one step checking, a TLD pair (j, k) jumps to the newer closest




· · · · · · · · ·
· · · A2(j, k, o) · · ·




The probability that a given TLD pair (m,ms) jumps to zero is equal to the prob-
ability that either m or ms jumps to zero i.e. either node B′c or node B′s is the target.
From equation (2.8), we have:
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Pr{DBoT = 0 | DBcT = m,DBsT = ms}
= Pr{DB′cT = 0 | DBcT = m}+ Pr{DB′sT = 0 | DBsT = ms}
− Pr{DB′cT = 0 | DBcT = m} × Pr{DB′sT = 0 | DBsT = ms}
(2.25)











2m × 2ms if m ≥ 5
1 if m < 5
(2.26)
Equation (2.26) gives the probability a TLD pair jumping to the newer closest TLD.
Let B2(j, k, 0) to be the probability that a TLD pair (j, k) jumps to 0, which is given




B2(1, 1, 0) B2(1, 2, 0) · · · B2(1, i, 0)
0 B2(2, 2, 0) · · · B2(2, i, 0)
· · · · · · ... · · ·




Then, following the similar steps as α = 1, matrix C˜2 can be derived. Let C2(j, k, l)
to be the probability that a TLD pair (j, k) takes l steps to reach 0, a three-dimensional
matrix C˜2 can be calculated by:
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C2(j, k, 1) = B2(j, k, 0)





A2(j, k, x)C(x, y, l − 1) j ≤ k ≤ i
(2.28)
When α = 2, the case is diﬀerent for two types of attack. The random sybil attack
and fake target attack will be discussed separately as following.
In Kademlia, the lookup terminates when the target node has been located or the
initiator queried and received from k closest nodes [15]. So in random attack, if one of
two queried nodes is sybil node and returns random fake nodes, the lookup procedure
does not terminate and the other node is still functional. Thus, only if both nodes are




C2(i, i, x)× (1− Psybil2)x (2.29)
Then a numerical result can be given. The total number of nodes has been set to
280.
In facing random sybil attack, with α = 2, the network is stronger than when it is with
α = 1. It is shown in ﬁgure 2.5 that as the number of Sybil nodes increases, Psuccess
drops slowly before the percentage of Sybil nodes less than 15%. After there are more
than 15% Sybil nodes in the network, Psuccess decreases fast.
In fake target attack, the sybil nodes returns a fake target node, so it means the
target node has been located for initiator. Then the Psuccess is given as:

















































C2(i, i, x)× (1− Psybil)2x (2.30)
In facing fake target attack, with α = 2 worsens the situation. From ﬁgure 2.6,
Psuccess drops sharply with increasing of sybil nodes, and the curve hits the bottom
when there is only 15% sybil nodes in the network.
2.2.3 When α = 3
When α = 3, the procedure is the similar to α = 2. Let node Bt to be the third
closest node to node T and the TLD between node Bt and node T is mt. The jumping


















































Figure 2.6: Psuccess when α = 2 for fake target attack
function is derived as:
Pr{DBoT ≥ mo | DBcT = m,DBsT = ms, DBtT = mt}
= Pr{DB′cT ≥ mo | DBcT = m} × Pr{DB′sT ≥ mo | DBsT = ms}


























mo ∈ [1,m− 1]
(2.31)
Then the pmf is possible to draw as:
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mo ∈ [1,m− 1]
(2.32)
Here equation (2.32) gives the probability a TLD triplet of three closest nodes
jumping to the newer closest TLD. Let(j, k, h) to be the a possible TLD triplet, o is
the newer closest TLD, A3(j, k, h, o) is the probability that after one step checking, the
TLD triplet jumps from (j, k, h) to the newer closest TLD o. Then A˜3 is the matrix of




· · · · · · · · ·
· · · A3(j, k, h, o) · · ·




The probability that a TLD triplet jumps to 0 is given as:
















2m × 2mt −
20× 20
2ms × 2mt +
20× 20× 20
2m × 2ms × 2mt if m ≥ 5
1 if m < 5
(2.34)
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Then, following the same steps as tracking A˜3, the probability of TLD (j, k, h)
jumping to 0 is given by equation 2.34. In which j, k, h are m,ms,mt respectively.




· · · · · · · · ·
· · · B3(j, k, h, 0) · · ·




Let C3(j, k, h, l) to be the probability that a TLD triplet (j, k, h) takes l steps to
reach 0, then four-dimensional matrix C˜3 can be calculated by,
C3(j, k, h, 1) = B3(j, k, h, 0) (2.36)







A3(j, k, h, x)× C(x, y, z, l − 1) j ≤ k ≤ h ≤ i (2.37)
Finally, Psuccess for both attack can be derived. In random sybil attack, the proba-




C2(i, i, i, x)× (1− Psybil3)x (2.38)




C2(i, i, i, x)× (1− Psybil)3x (2.39)


















































Figure 2.7: The distribution of Psuccess when α = 3
Figure 2.8: Psuccess when α = 3 for two attack model
When α = 3, the network is pretty strong in facing random sybil attack. Form
ﬁgure 2.8, to drop the Psuccess to 80%, Sybil nodes must occupy 25% of total nodes.
However, if the percentage of Sybil nodes keep increasing, 10% more Sybil node makes
Psuccess drop to less than 50%.
Just the opposite, when α = 3, the network is more vulnerable in facing fake target
attack. It shows in ﬁgure 2.8, only 5% of sybil nodes almost destroy the botnet. More
results discussing will be introduced in next chapter.
Chapter 3
Numerical Results
From the model analyzed in Chapter 2, some numerical results are given in this chapter.
In which, the look-up step distribution is shown ﬁrst. Then the relationship of Psuccess
and three system parameters will be analyzed. Followed by a discussing of average
steps to ﬁnd the target node. This chapter ends up with comparison with other’s work
in the literature.
3.1 Step distribution
Diﬀerent from other’s work, step distribution has been taken into consideration in our
work. Step distribution is the probability of the number of steps taken to ﬁnd the
target node. Through this distribution, structure characteristic of P2P based botnet is
unfolded in the results. Figure 3.1 shows the step distribution when α = 1, 2, 3 and the
total nodes and parameter k has been set to 240 and 20 respectively. From the ﬁgure,
we see that lager α results in less steps, which also reduces the risk of attacking.
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Figure 3.1: The distribution of the number of steps when α = 1, 2, 3 separately.
3.2 Psuccess and parameters
After analysis of the details about Kademlia, we want to ﬁgure out how eﬃcient the
Sybil attack is, and further more, which factor makes a P2P based botnet robust or
vulnerable. These question will be answered through our analysis. During our research,
we ﬁnd that three parameters may aﬀect Psuccess. Those three parameters are α (the
number of nodes queried in every step), k (triple list a node kept in one bucket) and
the total number of nodes n.
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3.2.1 Psuccess and α
Figure 3.2 shows Psuccess when α is 1, 2 or 3 for both attack model respectively. The
total number of nodes are set to 280 and k is equal to 20 for all α. Let’s call them
botnet A1, A2 and A3 when α is equal to 1, 2 and 3 separately.
In facing random sybil attack, when there are 5% Sybil nodes in the botnet, Psuccess
of botnet A1 drops to less than 40%, whereas it of botnet A2 and A3 stay over 95%.
When Sybil nodes occupy 10% of the network, botnet A1 has a Psuccess only at 11.28%,
and Psuccess of botnoet A2 is 83.37% and starts to drop faster, but botnet A3 still has a
Psuccess over 98%. When the Sybil nodes is getting more than 10% for A2 and 20% for
A3, Psuccess decreases rapidly. Psuccess reaches 20% when there are around 30% Sybil
nodes for A1 and as many as 55% are needed for A3. A1, however, reaches zero when
there are around 25% Sybil nodes.
The other way around, a larger α worsens the situation in facing fake target attack.
Only 15% for α = 2 and 10% for α = 3 kills the botnet. This is because in every step,
initiator queries α nodes and in fake target attack, and if any one of those α is sybil
nodes, the lookup procedure terminates. So a lager α results in more chance of sybil
nodes being choosing, which makes the botnet weaker.
From ﬁgure 3.2 and what has been discussed above, it is apparently that α is
a key parameter in Kademlia based botnet. When α = 1, it resembles Chord [45]
network. Kademlia was designed to be more reliable in dealing with node fail, so α
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was introduced. It is successfully in facing random sybil attack (which acts like massive





















































Figure 3.2: The distribution of Psuccess when α = 1, 2, 3 for two attack model separately.
3.2.2 Psuccess and the total number of nodes
Besides α, total number of nodes n also has been discussed frequently. Figure 3.3,
ﬁgure 3.4 and ﬁgure 3.5 shows relationship between Psuccess and total number of nodes
n. α is 1 in ﬁgure 3.3, 2 in ﬁgure 3.4 and 3 in ﬁgure 3.5. Parameter k equals to 20
in all three ﬁgures. All three ﬁgures show that the larger botnet is, the weaker it is.
In ﬁgure 3.3, when 5% Sybil nodes are in the botnet, Psuccess of botnet with n = 2128
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drops sharply to less than 20%, whereas it of botnet with n = 240 decreases to 60%. It
also shows from ﬁgure 3.4 and ﬁgure 3.5 that as the increasing number of Sybil nodes,


















































Figure 3.3: The distribution of Psuccess when total number of nodes n = 240, 280, 2128
separately. α has been set to 1 and k equals to 20.
In recent years, larger botnet has barely been detected. Other than improving
of network security, more people believe that hackers choose to limit the size of their
botnet. What has been discussed above may partially explain the reason. We only give
the results for random sybil attack, but the results for fake target attack are similar.


















































Figure 3.4: The distribution of Psuccess when total number of nodes n = 240, 280, 2128
separately. α has been set to 2 and k equals to 20.
3.2.3 Psuccess and parameter k
k known form k-bucket, is the number of triples a node keeps for distance within
every [2g, 2g+1). Figure 3.6 shows the relationship between distribution of Psuccess and
diﬀerent k. It the ﬁgure, three pairs of α and k are showed together. Parameter n has
been set to 240. All three pairs shows that the botnet with k = 100 is better than it
with k = 20. Specially for α = 3, Botnet with k = 100 holds 90% of success when 37%
of total nodes are Sybil nodes, while the one with k = 40 holds the same percentage
when there are 33% Sybil nodes. To hold Psuccess = 70%, there are 35% Sybil nodes

















































Figure 3.5: The distribution of Psuccess when total number of nodes n = 240, 280 sepa-
rately. α has been set to 3 and k equals to 20.
maximum for botnet with k = 40 and 40% Sybil nodes maximum for the one with
k = 100. It is not a big improvement from k = 20 to k = 100. However, For such small
improvement, every nodes are required to keep 80 triples more for each distances.
In a word, a larger k only strengthen botnet to a little extent, but the cost is
comparatively high.





















































Figure 3.6: The distribution of Psuccess when k = 20, 100 and α = 1, 2, 3 respectively.
Parameter n equals to 40.
3.3 Result Comparing
A familiar research to our study is Ping and her team’s work [42]. They investigated
in several aspects, such as network construction, C&C mechanisms, mitigation ap-
proaches, etc. Also, they analytically studied random Sybil attack on stormnet, which
uses Kademlia-based protocol as it’s communication module. Psuccess is deﬁned as the
probability of a bot receiving real command, which is the same as our Psuccess, and it
is given by: [42]:
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Psuccess = (1− nsybil
nsybil + n
)ltz (3.1)
Where ltz is the length of a search path within the botnet. This ltz is derived from





















































Figure 3.7: Comparing of results. α = 1, 2, 3 for both cases and k = 20, n = 240
Ping’s work is on random sybil attack. To compare two models, average steps uses
in Ping’s model is calculated from our model, in order to make two model comparable.
Figure 3.7 shows when α = 1, our result are similar, whereas totally diﬀerent when
α = 2, 3. Actually, all Ping’s three results are similar to our result when α equals
to 1. It is because that Ping uses a normalized formula for diﬀerent α, in which an
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average of steps are used as mentioned before. Then Ping’s work ignores α the key
structure characteristic of Kademlia. However, our research investigate the details of
look-up procedure. For deriving the Psuccess, the steps probability distribution was
involved instead of an average steps, thus how parameter α strengthen the botnet is
represented. So our results for α = 2, 3 are more accuracy than Ping’s work.
3.4 Summary
In this chapter, several results from our research has been shown. From the results,
three parameters are discussed. Then, an comparing to other’s results has been given
and it shows our research is more accuracy then others’ work.
Chapter 4
Conclusion and future work
4.1 Conclusion
In chapter 2, we proposed a Kademlia based botnet model and two assumptions have
been made. a) node ID space is full ﬁlled; b) Two types of attack, random sybil attack
and fake target attack, have been proposed.Then the relationship between parameter
α and steps distribution has been analyzed. First of all, a jumping function is derived.
Then through which, a jumping matrix is then derived, followed by a steps distribution
matrix. Later, by solving the matrix, we obtain the steps distribution. And with Psybil
introduced, the probability of ﬁnding target node successfully is achieved for both
attack model. It shows that the botnet is weak when α = 1 whereas pretty strong
when α = 3 in random sybil attack. A totally opposite result for fake target attack.
Kademlia based botnet is vulnerable in facing fake target attack when α = 1, 2 or 3.
Those results gives clue on how to attack botnet more eﬃciently.
In chapter 3, more detailed results have been given. In the ﬁrst place, it is shown
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that there are huge diﬀerences with diﬀerent αs. When α increases, the probability of
ﬁnding target node successful grows signiﬁcantly. It also shows that when α is larger,
the initiator takes less steps to reach target node. Then, it shows that the less nodes
in the network, the stronger the network is. Also, a bigger parameter k do strengthen
the botnet, but the cost is comparably high. Last but not the least, a comparing
work has been done. Comparing with [42], our work shows that the Kademlia based
botnet is hard to be attacked in facing random sybil attack, whereas it is vulnerable
in facing fake target attack. Our work is a successive research of Ping’s work, where
we introduced details about α = 2, 3 and a new attack model - fake target attack.
4.2 Future work
Although most of the important is captured by the model used in this thesis, the model
can be developed. One possible future work is attempt of making the model more
realistic. In the model, we assume the node ID space is full to simplify the calculation.
However, in real botnet, it is not full and the nodes are distributed following special
distribution. If that distribution can be found , more accurate results can be given.
Moreover, nodes fail or leaving can be added to the model in order to make the model
more realistic.
Because the jumping function is too complicated, we simplify it by only keeping the
key characteristic of α. So another possible future work is to track with the original
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jumping function to gain a more accuracy results.
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